The Widening Exception to the Warrant Requirement in the Area of Administrative Searches: New York v. Burger by Gershman, Dyan L
Boston College Law Review
Volume 29
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 7
9-1-1988
The Widening Exception to the Warrant
Requirement in the Area of Administrative
Searches: New York v. Burger
Dyan L. Gershman
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dyan L. Gershman, The Widening Exception to the Warrant Requirement in the Area of Administrative
Searches: New York v. Burger, 29 B.C.L. Rev. 1009 (1988), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol29/iss5/7
The Widening Exception to the Warrant Requirement in the Area of Administrative
Searches: New York v. Burger' — In the 1987 case of New York v. Burger, the United
States Supreme Court substantially extended the previously narrow closely regulated
business exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.[ This exception
pertnits warrantless administrative searches of certain closely regulated businesses and
industries.s Prior to New York v. Burger, this exception existed only for three heavily
regulated industries: the mining industry, the firearm industry, and the liquor industry. 4
The Supreme Court in New York v. Burger significantly expanded this exception to now
encompass the automobile dismantling industry. 5 The Supreme Court's holding in this
case, according to Justice Brennan's strongly worded dissent, signifies a major move
away from the warrant requirement in the realm of administrative searches.° The ulti-
mate effect of this move is a disintegration of fourth amendment protections for owners
and operators of commercial enterprises.'
The first clause of the fourth amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures." The second clause of the fourth amendment states that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause." Traditionally, the Supreme Court has read the reason-
ableness clause and the warrant clause 'together, thereby establishing that the fourth
amendment requires a warrant in order to conduct a reasonable search."' In the realm
of criminal searches, however, the Supreme Court has recognized many exceptions to
the warrant requirement, thereby allowing myriad warrantless searches to be reasonable
within the meaning of the fourth amendment."
In the area of administrative searches, the Supreme Court has recognized a specific
exception to the warrant requirement which is known as the "closely regulated business
exception."' 2 In essence, this exception permits warrantless searches to be reasonable
within the meaning of the fourth amendment upon two conditions.'" First, the business
L 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
2 See id. at 2648-49.
Id.
4 Id. at 2642-43; we Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mining industry); United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearm industry); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor industry).
5 107 S. Ct. at 2646.
Id. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7 Id.
8 U.S. CONS'''. amend. IV.
9 Id.
LO See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
" See, e.g., Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766, 768 (1969) (a warrantless search incident
to arrest is permissible); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (warrantless search
justified by exigent circumstances of hot pursuit is permissible); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153 (1925) (no warrant required to stop and search an automobile); see also, Bradley, Two
Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mien. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985).
12 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2643. See generally W. LAFAVE, SEARCH ANTI) SEIZURE § 10.2 (1987); Note,
Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 CORNELL
L. REV. 856 (1979); Note, Administrative Agency Searches Since Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Probable
Cause Requirements for Nonroutine Administrative Searches, 70 Gm. L.J. 1183 (1982) [hereinafter Note,
Administrative Agency Searches Since Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.]; Note, Entries and Searches in the
Administrative Setting, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230 (1984-1985); Note, Constitutional Law Warrantless
Administrative Searches and the Two-Step Test of Donovan v. Dewey, 56 Tut.. L. REV. 1467 (1982).
' 3 See Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2643-44,
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must be part of a closely or pervasively regulated industry." Second, the warrantless
search must be conducted pursuant to a regulatory scheme that satisfies the Supreme
Court's three-part reasonableness test. 15 The first prong of the test requires that the state
have a substantial government interest in regulating the industry."' The second prong
of the test requires that the regulation of the industry furthers this substantial govern-
ment interest," and that the warrantless administrative search is necessary to advance
the state's regulatory scheme. 18
 The third prong of the test requires that the statute
provide an adequate substitute for a warrant.i 9
 Therefore, when the Supreme Court
classifies a business as closely regulated, the warrant clause no longer applies; the rea-
sonableness clause, however, still applies.'"
The case of New York v. Burger began in November 1982 when five police officers
entered Joseph Burger's junkyard in Brooklyn, New York." Joseph Burger is a vehicle
dismantler, and the officers were at the junkyard to conduct an administrative search
pursuant to section 415-a5 of the New York vehicle and traffic laws. 22
 Section 415-a
applies to vehicle dismantlers and junkyard owners in the state of New York." This
statute requires vehicle dismantlers and junkyard owners to keep certain records."
Section 415-a5 also permits police officers to inspect these records, and any vehicles
subject to the record keeping requirements, without a warrant. 25 The officers asked
la Id.
'ft Id.
16 Id, at 2644.
17 See id,
15 Id.
15 Id.
20 See id. at 2643.
21 Id. at 2639.
22 Id, The statute involved was N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 415-a5 (McKinney 1986). This statute
reads in relevant part:
Records and Identification. (a) Any records required by this section shall apply
only to vehicles or parts of vehicles for which a certificate of title has been issued by
the commissioner [of the Department of Motor Vehicles] or which would be eligible
to have such a certificate of title issued. Every person required to be registered
pursuant to this section shall maintain a record of all motor vehicles, trailers, and
major component parts thereof, coming into his possession together with a record of
the disposition of any such motor vehicle, trailer or part thereof and shall maintain
proof of ownership for any motor vehicle, trailer or major component part thereof
while in his possession .... Upon request of an agent of the commissioner or of any
police officer and during his regular and usual business hours, a vehicle dismantler
shall produce such records and permit said agent or police officer to examine them
and any vehicles or parts of vehicles which are subject to the record keeping require-
ments of this section and which are on the premises .... The failure to produce such
records or to permit such inspection on the part of any person required to be registered
pursuant to this section as required by this paragraph shall be a class A misdemeanor.
Id.
25 N.Y. VEIL. & TRAF. LAW § 415-al (McKinney 1986) (definition and registration of vehicle
dismantlers). A vehicle dismantler is any person who is engaged in the business of acquiring motor
vehicles or trailers for the purpose of dismantling the same for parts or reselling such vehicles as
scrap. Id. No person shall engage in the business of or operate as a vehicle dismantler unless there
shall have been issued to him a registration in accordance with the provisions of this section. Id. A
violation of this subdivision shall be a class E felony. Id.
"See supra note 22 for the text of the statute.
45 See supra note 22 for the text of the statute.
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Burger to show them his license28 and his police book." Burger told the police officers
that he did not have these documents."
The officers then informed Burger that they would conduct a warrantless inspection
pursuant to section 415-a5. 29 Burger did not object." The officers, in accordance with
their usual practice, copied down the Vehicle Inspection Numbers (V1Ns) of some of
the vehicles and parts of vehicles in the junkyard." When the police officers checked
these numbers against a police computer, they determined that Burger was in possession
of stolen vehicles and parts." Burger was arrested and charged with five counts of
possession of stolen property, and one count of unregistered operation as a vehicle
dismantler in violation of the statute."
At trial in the Kings County Supreme Court, Burger moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during the inspection, principally arguing that the regulatory statute was
unconstitutional" because it permitted warrantless searches in violation of the fourth
amendment. 38 The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the junkyard business was
a "pervasively regulated" industry.38 Therefore, the trial court reasoned, a warrantless
administrative inspection conducted pursuant to a statute that was properly limited in
"time, place and scope" was permissible." Moreover, the trial court held that when the
officers obtained information giving them reasonable cause to believe that sonic vehicles
and parts were stolen, they did not need a warrant before arresting Burger and seizing
the property.38 The Appellate Division affirmed for the same reasons. 39
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division on the basis that
the statute authorized searches to uncover criminal activity, and not to enforce a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme." Therefore, the court of appeals held that the statute
was unconstitutional because it permitted warrantless searches for evidence of crimes in
violation of the fourth amendment." The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of
the important state interest involved."
The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, reversed the New York Court of
Appeals.'" The Supreme Court held that the warrantless administrative search of the
automobile junkyard, conducted pursuant to section 415-a5 which authorized the search,
8" Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2639.
87 Id. at 2039-40, A police book is a record of all the vehicles and parts coming into the
possession of a vehicle dismantler and the disposition thereof. See N.Y. VEIL & 1I I. LAW § 415-
a5 (McKinney 1986).
88 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2640.
" Id.
" Id.
3i Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
" See People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 342, 493 N.E.2d 926, 928 (1986).
36 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2640.
37 Id .
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2641.
4° Id.
41 Id,
18 Id.
43 Id. at 2652.
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was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment because it fell within an
exception to the warrant requirement." An exception to the general warrant require-
ment exists for administrative searches of closely regulated industries.*
The Supreme Court in Burger concluded that vehicle dismantling is a closely regu-
lated business in New York.* The Court noted the quantity of regulations governing
automobile dismantling in New York.47
 An operator in this industry must obtain a license,
pay a fee, maintain a police book, and have all records and inventory available for
inspection by the police." In addition, the Court reasoned that because the automobile
dismantling industry was very similar to the closely regulated general junkyard industry,
it was, by association, also closely regulated.* Traditionally, the Court has required that
a business have a long history of government oversight in order to qualify as a closely
regulated business." The Burger Court, however, stated that because vehicle dismantling
was a relatively young industry, a long history was not possible.'" The Court then imputed
the general junkyard industry's long history of regulation to the automobile dismantling
industry because of the similarities between the two industries." Therefore, because of
the vehicle dismantling industry's own regulation, and its association with a long regu-
lated industry, the Court held that the automobile dismantling industry was closely
regulated."
After determining that the vehicle dismantling industry was a closely regulated
industry, the Burger Court analyzed the regulatory statute permitting the warrantless
search and held that it satisfied the Court's three-part test." Therefore, the Court held
that the search was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment." The
Court ruled that the regulatory scheme satisfied the first prong of the three-part test
because the state has a substantial interest in reducing car theft, and vehicle dismantlers
provide a major market for stolen cars." The Court held that the statute passed the
second prong of the test because a state may reasonably believe that requiring vehicle
dismantlers to register and to keep records may inhibit their role in the traffic of stolen
vehicles.." The Court also concluded that warrantless searches were necessary because
of the need for frequent and unannounced inspections." The Court ruled that the
44 Id. at 2648-49.
" Id.
"Id. at 2644.
" Id. at 2644-45.
55 Id.
5° Id. at 2646.
5°
 See id. at 2645.
5 ' Id. The Supreme Court in Burger stated•that because of the relatively recent phenomenon
of the widespread use of automobiles in our society, automobile junkyards and vehicle dismantlers
have not existed for very long and therefore do not have a long history of government regulation.
Id. Furthermore, the Court stated, this industry did not even attract government attention until the
1950s when used automobiles were no longer easily reabsorbed into the steel industry and attention
turned to the problems concerning discarded automobiles and motor vehicle parts. Id.
" Id. at 2646.
" Id.
" Id. at 2646-48.
55 /d. at 2646.
56
 Id. at 2647.
" Id.
55 Id. at 2648.
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statute satisfied the third prong of the test by providing an adequate substitute for a
warrant." The Court held that the statute provided an adequate substitute for a warrant
because it placed a business owner on notice that periodic inspections could occur, and
it sufficiently limited the discretion of the inspecting officers." Therefore, the Burger
Court held that the warrantless administrative search did not violate the fourth amend-
ment because it found that Burger's automobile dismantling business was part of a
closely regulated industry, and that the search was conducted pursuant to a statute that
satisfied the Court's three-part reasonableness test."
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and O'Connor, dissented. 62 Justice
Brennan argued that the vehicle dismantling industry was not a closely regulated industry
and, therefore, the police needed an administrative warrant to search the commercial
premises. 65 Justice Brennan emphasized that if the mere requirement of a filing fee and
a license were sufficient to place a commercial business into a closely regulated business
category, few businesses could ever escape this label." Therefore, he concluded, fourth
amendment protections for commercial businesses would be almost non-existent in the
area of administrative searches. 65
Justice Brennan further asserted that even if vehicle dismantling were a closely
regulated industry, this search violated the fourth amendment." justice Brennan argued
that the search was unconstitutional because section 415-a did not create a "predictable
and guided [governmental] presence" so as to provide an adequate substitute for a
warrant, and thus failed the third prong of the Court's reasonableness test.° Therefore,
Justice Brennan argued, because the vehicle dismantling industry was not closely regu-
lated, and because the statute did not satisfy the third prong of the Court's reasonableness
test, the warrantless search was not reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment." Furthermore, Justice Brennan argued, the regulatory statute was fundamentally
flawed because it permitted warrantless searches intended solely to uncover evidence of
criminal acts." Thus, Justice Brennan asserted that the warrantless search was in violation
of the fourth amendment.'"
New York v. Burger represents a significant and dangerous move in the direction of
making a warrant requirement the exception to the rule in the area of administrative
searches." If a filing fee, a license requirement, and the obligation to maintain records
59 See id,
Go See id.
See id. at 2646.
62 Id. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined in the dissent in all but Part
III, in which Justice Brennan contended that the fundamental defect of the statute was that it
authorized criminal searches. Id. at 2655-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor agreed
that the vehicle dismantling industry was not closely regulated and that even if it were, the search
violated the fourth amendment because the statute did not provide an adequate substitute for a
warrant. Id. at 2652-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65 1(1. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 2653 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 2657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 2654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97 See id. (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 593,609 (1981)).
' Id. at 2652,2654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69 Id, at 2655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'° Id. at 2656 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7 ' See id. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
•
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are sufficient to establish the existence of a "closely regulated" industry, very few busi-
nesses or industries could escape this classification. 72 The Supreme Court in New York v.
Burger reaffirmed the rule that once an industry has been classified as a part of a closely
regulated industry, the regulatory scheme must pass a reasonableness test before a
warrantless search will be found to be reasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. 73 The relative ease, however, with which the regulatory scheme in New York
v. Burger passed this test indicates an end to the general rule that a warrant is required
for administrative searches of commercial property. 74
The Supreme Court's holding in New York v. Burger signals the virtual elimination
of fourth amendment protections for owners and operators of commercial businesses in
the realm of administrative searches." Section I of this casenote examines the develop-
ment of the closely regulated business exception to the general warrant requirement for
administrative searches. 76 Section II presents the Supreme Court's opinion in New York
v. Burger, including the dissenting opinion. 77 Section 1I1 critically analyzes the Supreme
Court's reasoning in the majority opinion and Justice Brennan's reasoning in his dis-
senting opinion.78
 Finally, Section III concludes that the Supreme Court, through its
decision in New York v. Burger, has moved dangerously close to the elimination of fourth
amendment protections for owners of commercial businesses in the area of administrative
searches. 78
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLOSELY REGULATED BUSINESS EXCEPTION
The fourth amendment of the Constitution establishes the right of people to be,
secure against "unreasonable search and seizure" and sets forth that "no Warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause." 20 The basic purpose of the fourth amendment is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals by preventing officers from exercising
unbridled discretion or arbitrarily invading their privacy. 81 The fourth amendment is
enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment. 22 Traditionally, the
Supreme Court has read the two clauses of the fourth amendment, the warrant clause
and the reasonableness clause, together, thereby establishing that warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable. 83 Accordingly, the general rule is that a warrant, issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate and based upon a showing of probable cause, is nec-
essary before a search will be reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment."
If a search is not reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the exclu-
sionary rule forbids the introduction of the evidence obtained in the search in both state
72 Id. at 2653 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 2642-44.
74 See id. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75 Id.
75 See infra notes 80-200 and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 201-273 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 274-361 and accompanying text.
79 Id.
8° U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Hi Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,528 (1967).
82 id.
83 See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,546 (1967).
84 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204,213 (1981).
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and federal courts. 89 The warrant requirement is applicable to both criminal and ad-
ministrative searches."
There is an essential difference between a criminal search and an administrative
search, and that difference is in what the search is intended to uncover." A criminal
search is intended to uncover evidence of violations of the penal code, whereas an
administrative search is intended to assure conformity, or discover nonconformity, with
regulatory statutes.ss These regulatory statutes often involve licensing, record-keeping,
or health and safety issues. 89 There is, however, a crucial link that is possible between
these two types of searches. If evidence of criminal activity is discovered in the process
of a valid administrative search, the evidence may be seized under the plain view
doctrine." The plain view doctrine establishes that if in the course of a valid search,
evidence of illegal activity is visible, the evidence may be legally seized. 9 i
Although warrants are generally required for both criminal and administrative
searches, the standards for obtaining a warrant differ." Warrants for criminal searches
must be based upon a showing of probable cause." Probable cause exists when "the facts
and the circumstances within . (the officers'] knowledge and of which they have
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution ... [to believe] that an offense has been or is being committed." 94 Warrants for
administrative searches may be based upon less than probable cause.° 5 Warrants for
administrative searches may be based upon a showing that reasonable administrative
standards for conducting an inspection have been satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling or business establishment." However, no specific knowledge of any regulatory
code violation is necessary.97
The rationale for having the lower standard for administrative searches is based
upon the purpose of these searches. Administrative searches provide a means to enforce
city-wide compliance with municipal codes." These codes often concern health, licensing,
record-keeping, or safety issues." Because police officers usually do not have specific
information concerning code violations with respect to a particular building or dwelling,
the officers would rarely have sufficient information to meet the probable cause stan-
dard)" Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, if traditional probable cause were
the standard for administrative searches, few code-enforcement inspections could take
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 655 (1961).
96 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534, 535.
87 Id. at 534-35.
as See id. at 535.
89 See id.
96 Michigan v, Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 (1984).
91 Id.
g' See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-38.
95 Id. at 535.
w Note, Administrative Agency Searches Since Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra note 12, at 1186
n.15 (1982) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)).
95 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
" Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 535.
" See id.
101 Id. at 536, 537.
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place.' 61
 This, in turn, would significantly weaken the government's ability to prevent or
abate conditions that may be hazardous to public health and safety. 1 °2 The lesser standard
of probable cause for administrative searches is further justified in that these searches
are not intended to uncover evidence of crimes, nor are they personal in nature, and,
thus, they involve a fairly limited invasion into a person's privacy. 103
Although warrants are generally required for administrative searches, there is a
specific exception to the warrant requirement for searches of closely regulated busi-
nesses. 104 The rationale underlying this exception to the warrant requirement is based
upon the notion of privacy expectations. 105 In theory, an owner of a business in a heavily
regulated industry has a lessened expectation of privacy and has, in a sense, agreed to
voluntarily subject himself or herself to government inspections.L 06 Therefore, where
the privacy expectations of the owner of a business are weakened, and the state interests
in regulating a particular industry are concomitantly heightened, a warrantless admin-
istrative inspection of the business may be constitutionally permissible.H" Notwithstand-
ing the closely regulated business exception to the warrant requirement, the general
rule remains that a warrant is required for a search to be constitutionally permissible. 108
Warrants were not always required for administrative searches.]°`' in 1959, the
Supreme Court in Frank v. Maryland held that a warrantless administrative search did
not violate the fourth amendment."° In Frank, a health department official conducted
a warrantless administrative search of a private home pursuant to a municipal building
code regulation that permitted such searches.'" The Frank Court based its decision on
the ground that fourth amendment protections applied only to searches for evidence of
criminal activity." 2 The Court concluded that because the inspection in Frank v. Maryland
was not to uncover evidence of criminal activity, it touched only at the periphery of
fourth amendment protections." 3 Thus, the warrantless inspection, conducted pursuant
to municipal building code regulations, did not violate the fourth amendment." 4
In 1967, the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court overturned Frank v.
Maryland."° The Camara Court stated that the fourth amendment privacy interests at
stake during municipal fire, health, and housing inspections are not merely peripheral." 6
101 See id. at 537.
102 See id. at 536, 537.
103 See id. at 537.
um See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (no warrant necessary for administrative
search of a mining organization); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (no warrant necessary
for administrative search of a business dealing in firearms); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (no warrant necessary for administrative search of liquor dealer's busi-
ness).
LOO See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 313 (1978); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
1°5 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313.
102 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2643.
100 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29.
m Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959).
"° id.
L" Id. at 361.
112 See id. at 365, 367.
13 1d. at 367.
114 See id.
116 Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
116 Id.
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The issue in Camara was whether a city housing inspector could conduct a warrantless
inspection of a home pursuant to a housing ordinance.° The Camara Court held that
administrative health, fire, and housing inspections, authorized and conducted without
a warrant, were significant intrusions upon privacy interests protected by the fourth
amendment. 1113 The Court reaffirmed the traditional notion that a warrant is necessary
to circumscribe the discretion of officers and thereby safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.u" Elucidating the
rationale behind the fourth amendment, Justice White, writing for the Court in Camara,
stated:
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern,
not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent. 12 °
Camara v. Municipal Court stands for the proposition that a warrant is required prior
to administrative searches of private residences.' 2 ' The Camara Court, however, indicated
that because most people will allow an inspection without a warrant, warrants should
normally be sought only after entry is refused.' 22 A magistrate may issue a warrant for
an administrative search upon less than the usual level of probable cause necessary for
a criminal search warrant.' 23 The Supreme Court stated in Camara that a magistrate may
issue an an administrative search warrant if the proposed inspection complies with
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards."'" These standards, the Court stated,
may refer to the nature of the building, or the condition of the entire area, but they do
not need to depend upon specific information concerning the condition of a particular
.building.' 23 Commentators have noted that magistrates issue administrative search war-
rants if procedures are followed to ensure against an arbitrary selection of homes or
businesses.' 26
The warrant requirement, held to apply to administrative searches of private resi-
dences in Camara, was extended to administrative searches of businesses in the 1967 case
of See v. City of Seattle.'" In See, the issue was whether a representative of the Seattle
Fire Department needed an administrative warrant prior to conducting an administrative
search as part of a routine city-wide canvas to ensure compliance with the fire code. 126
The Court in See stated that "the businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a
constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable entries upon his
17 Id. at 525.
118 Id. at 534.
119 Id. at 528.
120 Id. at 529.
181 See id. at 534.
I22 Id, at 539-40.
123 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 10,2, at 631.
184 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
128 Id.
128 See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9, at 188 (1985).
'" 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967). See was the companion case to Camara v. Municipal Court. Id. at
542.
126 Id. at 541.
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private commercial property." 28 The See Court noted both the rapid increase of gov-
ernmental regulations of businesses, and the need to inspect commercial businesses to
enforce such regulatory laws.'" The See Court held, however, that "warrants are a
necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect commercial
premises."'" The See Court implied that the Camara Court's assertion that inspectors
should generally seek warrants only after entry is refused does not apply to business
inspections "since surprise may be a crucial aspect of routine inspections of business
establishments ...." 1"
In 1970, the Supreme Court created an exception to the general warrant require-
ment for administrative searches.'" In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, the Court
held that a federal statute authorizing a warrantless administrative search of the business
premises of a federally licensed liquor dealer did not violate the fourth amendment.'"
The Court reasoned that the liquor industry was a "closely regulated" industry's' and
had long been subject to close supervision and inspection.' 16 The Court deferred to
Congress' broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness in searches and sei-
zures.'" The Colonnade Court noted the long history of government regulations, dating
back to 1692, permitting warrantless searches of liquor establishments and concluded
that such searches were reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment.' 38
Two years later, in 1972, the Supreme Court extended this closely regulated business
exception to the firearm industry.' 3  In United States v. Biswell, the Court held that the
warrantless search of a federally licensed gun dealer's locked storeroom, as part of a
federally authorized inspection procedure,'" was reasonable within the meaning of the
fourth amendment."' The Court in Biswell reasoned that although federal regulation of
the firearm industry was not as "deeply rooted in history" as governmental regulation
of the liquor industry, 142 it was important in the prevention of violent crimes and in the
control of the interstate traffic in firearms.'The Court stated that the situation in
Biswell was distinctly different from the situation in See v. City of Seattle.'" The Court
reasoned that building code violations, which were at issue in See, are difficult to conceal
'" Id. at 543.
1 " Id. at 543-44.
"I Id. at 544.
132
	 at 545 n.6.
133 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
134 Id. Section 5146(b) of the United States Code provides:
The Secretary or his delegate may enter during business hours the • premises
(including places of storage) of any dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining
any records or other documents required to be kept by such dealer under this chapter
or regulations issued pursuant thereto and any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or
stored by such dealer on such premises.
26 U.S,C. 5146(b) (1954).
"5 Id. at 74.
138 Id. at 75.
137
	 at 77.
138 Id. at 75, 77.
19 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
148 Id. at 312.
"11d. at 317.
142 Id. at 315.
143 Id.
'" Id. at 316.
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or correct quickly, and, therefore, the warrant requirement would not frustrate enforce-
ment efforts.'" Firearms and ammunition, however, could be hidden or disposed of
quickly. Therefore, the Court in Biswell stated that frequent and unannounced inspec-
tions were necessary for inspections to be effective and serve to deter unlawful prac-
tices.'" Therefore, the Court reasoned, a warrant requirement could frustrate inspec-
tions."'
The Court in Biswell held that the warrantless inspection was reasonable within the
meaning of the fourth amendment because the regulatory inspections furthered urgent
federal interests,'" and because the statute was "carefully limited in time, place and
scope."'" The Court stated that such warrantless inspections created only slight threats
to the dealer's justifiable expectations Of privacy because the gun dealer had chosen to
engage in a pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license.'" Thus, the
Court concluded, the dealer was aware that his or her business records, firearms and
ammunition would be subject to inspection under the Gun Control Act of 1968. 15 ' The
theory, set forth in Colonnade and Biswell, that individuals with businesses that are part
of closely regulated industries have a lessened expectation of privacy is known as the
Colonnade-Biswell doctrine.'"
In 1978, the Supreme Court checked this move in the direction of allowing war-
rantless administrative searches.'" I n the 1978 case of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., the Court
held that a warrantless administrative search of an electrical and plumbing installation
business, conducted pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA), violated the fourth amendment.'" The Supreme Court distinguished Marshall
from Colonnade and Biswell, finding that the statute in Marshall failed to tailor the scope
and frequency of the administrative searches to the specific health and safety concerns
"5 Id.
146 Id.
"7 Id. The Court's argument that a warrant requirement would destroy the effectiveness of the
inspections seems to be based on the Camara Court's notion that an administrative search warrant
should only be sought when entry has been refused. The Court in See, however, intimated that this
notion does not necessarily apply to inspections of businesses due to the need to retain the surprise
element. See See, 387 U.S. at 545 n.6.
°R 406 U.S. at 317.
149 Id. at 315.
150 Id. at 316.
151 Id. Section 923(g) of the Gun Control Act of 1968 authorizes official entry during business
hours into "the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition ... dealer
• for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be kept
... and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such ... dealer ... at such premises."
Biswell, 906 U.S. at 311 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §.923(g) (1982)).
152 New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2643.
151 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 324.
1 " Id. Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of' 1970 authorizes the Secretary
of Labor, upon presenting his credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge:
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment,
construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed
by an employee of an employer; and (2) to inspect and investigate during regular
working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a
reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, struc-
tures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question
privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee.
29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970).
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presented by each of the numerous businesses regulated by the statute.'" The Marshall
Court stated that, unlike the statutes at issue in Colonnade and &swell, OSHA regulated
all businesses involved in interstate conamerce. 156 Therefore, because OSHA was not
specific to the industry in question, the Court held that it was insufficient, by itself, to
bring the electrical and plumbing business within the closely regulated business exception
to the warrant requirement.'"
The Court in Marshall emphasized that Colonnade and Biswell were unique exceptions
to the warrant requirement.'" The Marshall Court also expressly reaffirmed that the
lessened expectation of privacy that exists when an individual engages in a closely
regulated industry is a central element to consider in evaluating the constitutionality of
a warrantless search. 15`° The Marshall Court stated that the distinguishing factor separat-
ing a closely regulated business from an ordinary business is that a closely regulated
business has a long history of close governmental supervision of which any person
entering the business must already be aware.'" The Court reasoned that a person in a
closely regulated industry, such as the liquor industry in Colonnade or the firearms
industry in Biswell, has implicitly agreed to submit to the restrictions placed on him or
her."' Therefore, stated the Court, such a person has a lessened expectation of privacy
and a warrantless administrative search may be constitutionally permissib:e. 162 In Mar-
shall, however, the Supreme Court held that because OSHA covers all businesses involved
in interstate commerce, the business in question could not be considered closely regulated
merely on the basis of OSHA.I 63 Therefore, concluded the Court, the fourth amendment
required that the inspector obtain a warrant prior to conducting any inspection of the
business.'"
Thus, the Supreme Court in Marshall reaffirmed the importance of a warrant in
protecting individual privacy rights. A warrant, the Court noted, provides assurance that
a neutral and detached judicial officer has determined that a search is reasonable under
the Constitution, is permitted by statute, and is part of an administrative plan established
with neutral criteria. 165 Moreover, stated the Court, a warrant advises a business owner,
at the time of inspection, of the scope and objects of the search.'"
The Marshall Court held that in order for a warrantless inspection to be reasonable,
it had to be necessary to the accomplishment of the administrative goals."' The Marshall
155 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313-14.
' 56 See id.
Id.
' 58 Id. at 313.
' 59 Id.
160 Id. The Court stated:
Certain industries have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable
expectation of privacy could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise.
Liquor (Colonnade) and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type; when an entre-
preneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself
to a full arsenal of government regulation.
Id.
L61
162
 See id.
165 Id. at 313-14.
164
	 at 324.
Id. at 323.
166 Id
167 See id. at 316.
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Court rejected the argument that warrantless inspections were necessary to the proper
enforcement of OSHA in that they were conducted without prior notice and, thus,
preserved the element of surprise.m The Court reasoned that even if an inspector were
refused entry, the inspector would not necessarily lose the surprise element. 189 The
Court stated that warrants may be issued ex parte and executed without delay and, thus,
an inspector could retain the advantage of surprise that accompanies warrantless searches
by simply reappearing unannounced at the business to be searched.' 70 Although the
Secretary of Labor had promulgated regulations requiring a special procedure if entry
were denied, the Marshall Court stated that the Secretary has the authority instead to
permit inspectors to obtain a warrant ex parte upon refusal of entry. 17 ' Furthermore, the
Court indicated that inspectors could avoid the problem of having to return a second
time with a warrant by simply regularly conducting inspections only after having ob-
tained, ex parte, an administrative warrant. 02 In this manner, the element of surprise
would never be lost.'" The Court rejected the notion that requiring warrants to inspect
commercial sites would impose a heavy burden on the courts or on the administrative
inspection system. 174 Moreover, the Court stated that most businessmen would consent
to an inspection without a warrant.' 75 Thus, the Marshall Court concluded that warrant-
less administrative inspections were riot necessary to further the regulatory scheme of
OSHA, and, therefore, the Court held that the warrantless inspection was not reasonable
within the meaning of the fourth amenclment. 176
In 1981, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the closely regulated business exception to
the warrant requirement in Donovan v. Dewey. 77 In Dewey, the Court held that a war-
rantless inspection, conducted pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977 (FMSHA), did not violate the fourth amendment.' 78 The Supreme Court rioted
that the narrow exception to the warrant requirement had previously been limited to
businesses with a long tradition of close government supervision. 179 The Dewey Court,
however, stated that it is the pervasiveness and regularity of governmental supervision,
and not merely the duration of regulation, which determines whether a warrant will be
"A Id.
199 1d. at 319-20.
"0 Id.
171 Id. at 320 n.15.
'72 See id. at 316, 817 n.12.
173 Id. at 316.
174 Id.
175 Id. When an individual consents to an inspection, a warrant is not required. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
'" Marshall, 436 U.S. at 316, 324.
'" 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981).
173 Id. The Court explained that section 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1982), requires federal mine inspectors to inspect underground mines at
least four times a year and surface mines at least twice a year to ensure compliance with the
mandatory health and safety standards developed by the Secretary of Labor to govern the operation
of United States mines. Id. at 596. This section, the Court stated, also requires federal mine
inspectors to make repeated inspections to determine whether previously discovered violations have
been corrected. Id. The Court further indicated that this section also grants inspectors "a right of
entry to, upon, or through any coal or other mine," and states that "no' advance notice of an
inspection shall be provided to any person." Id. (quoting '30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1982)).
179
 Dewey, 452 U.S. at 605-06.
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required. 1 "U The Court reasoned that if only businesses with a long history of government
regulation were subject to warrantless searches, absurd results would occur."" For ex-
ample, all emerging industries, including the nuclear power industry, would be exempt
from such searches.'"
In Dewey, the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine if a warrantless
administrative search of a commercial property satisfied the reasonableness clause of the
fourth amendment thereby making the search constitutionally permissible.'" First, such
an inspection would not violate the fourth amendment if Congress had reasonably
determined that warrantless searches were needed in order to advance a regulatory
scheme. '&' Second, the owner of a commercial property must have been unable to help
being aware that his or her property would be inspected periodically for specific purposes
based upon a well defined regulatory scheme.'" The Court stated that this awareness
occurs when a statute is specifically tailored to the particular problems of an industry. 186
Therefore, the Court determined the reasonableness, and thus the constitutionality, of
the warrantless search on the basis of particular enforcement needs and the individual
privacy protections of each statute.m Thus, according to the Dewey two-part test, war-
rantless administrative inspections of businesses violated the fourth amendment reason-
ableness clause if such inspections were "so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that
the owner, for all practical purposes, ha[d] no real expectation that his property w[ould]
from time to time be inspected by government officials." 1 B8
The Supreme Court distinguished Dewey from Marshall using the second prong of
the two-part test.' 89
 This prong requires a statute to be sufficiently comprehensive and
defined that an owner of a business can not help but be aware that his or her property
will be subject to periodical inspections undertaken for specifically defined purposes."°
The Supreme Court stated that unlike in Marshall where the statute in question, OSHA,
was not specifically tailored to any clear industry, in Dewey, the statute, FMSHA, was
specifically tailored to the safety and health issues associated with mines."' In addition,
the Supreme Court noted that the Act at issue in Marshall, OSHA, did not provide any
standards concerning the selection of businesses to be searched. 142
 Conversely, the statute
in Dewey, FMSHA, required inspection of all mines and specifically defined the frequency
of inspections.'" Therefore, FMSHA provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for
a warrant, whereas OSHA did not."'
The Supreme Court's position on the issue of warrantless administrative searches
of commercial businesses appeared stable following its 1981 decision in Dewey. The
180 Id.
181
 Id. at 606.
192 Id.
193
 Id. at 600.
184 Id.
195 Id.
' 99 See H. at 603.
' 87 Id. at 601-02.
199 Id. at 599.
189 See id. at 600.
luo
19, Id. at 603.
' 92
 Id. at 601.
199 Id. at 603-04. See supra note 178 for a discussion of the Act's requirements.
L" See id. at 603-04.
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Court's stance was that an exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement
existed for administrative searches of closely regulated industries.' 95 The Court narrowly
defined the term "closely regulated" to include only those industries that either had a
long history of governmental regulation, or were pervasively regulated at the present
time. 196 Moreover, the Court stated that the searches must be reasonable within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, and, to determine reasonableness, the Court estab-
lished a two-part test. 197 The first prong of the test required that Congress had reasonably
determined that warrantless searches were necessary to the enforcement of the regula-
tion.'" The second prong required that an owner of a business could not help but be
aware that his or her property would be subject to periodic inspections based upon a
well defined regulatory scheme. 199 The narrow exception to the warrant requirement in
the area of administrative searches was considerably extended in the 1987 case of New
York v. Burger. 200
II. NEW YORK V. BURGER: THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In the 1987 case of New York v. Burger, the Supreme Court expanded the previously
narrow closely regulated business exception to the warrant requirement to include the
automobile dismantling business. 201 Prior to New York v. Burger, the only industries held
by the Supreme Court to be closely regulated were the liquor industry (Colonnade ),2o2
the firearm industry (Biswell), 2" and the mining industry (Dewey). 2°4 In addition to ex-
tending the boundaries of the closely regulated business exception, the Court refor-
mulated the two-part reasonableness test established in Dewey and set forth a three-part
test for determining when a warrantless administrative search is constitutionally permis-
sible under the fourth amendment. 2" The first prong of the test requires that the state
have a substantial interest in regulating the industry. 206 The second prong requires that
the regulation of the industry serve the state's substantial interest, and that warrantless
inspections are necessary to further the regulatory scheme. 207 The third and final prong
requires that the statute provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. 2"
The Court in Burger held that the warrantless administrative search, conducted
pursuant to section 415-a5 of the New York vehicle and traffic laws, 209 passed the three-
part test, making the search reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 210
First, the state had a "substantial interest" in regulating this industry due to increased
19,
 Id. at 600.
196 Id. at 599-600.
19/ Id. at 598.
195 Id. at 600.
199 Id.
290 107 S. Ct. 2636,2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 2644.
202 See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of Colonnade.
"'See supra notes 139-151 and accompanying text for a discussion of &swell.
204 See supra notes 177- 194 and accompanying text For a discussion of Dewey.
2° 5 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2643-44.
296 Id. at 2644.
20 Id.
' 2°5 Id.
299 Id. at 2639 n. I. See supra note 22 for the text of the statute.
210 Id. at 2646.
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motor vehicle theft in New York.2 " Second, the regulation of the industry served the
state's substantial interest in reducing car theft, and warrantless searches are necessary
for furthering the regulatory schetne. 212
 Third, the statute provided an adequate sub-
stitute for a warrant. 213
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Supreme Court in New York v. Burger, addressed
the issue of whether a warrantless administrative search, conducted pursuant to a New
York statute, was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 214
 Justice
Blackmun began his analysis by reaffirming that the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to commercial premises as well as to
private homes.216
 Therefore, the Court stated that the owner of a business has a reason-
able expectation of privacy with respect to traditional police searches for criminal evi-.
dence, and also with respect to administrative inspections whose purpose is to enforce
regulatory statutes. 2 '6
 The Court, however, upheld the Colonnade-Biswell doctrine which
states that an owner of a business in a closely regulated industry necessarily has a lessened
expectation of privacy. 217
Because owners of businesses that are closely regulated have a reduced expectation
of privacy, the warrant requirement, which establishes the reasonableness of a govern-
ment search under the fourth amendment, is less stringent.218
 The Supreme Court in
Burger stated that when an owner's privacy interests are very weak, and the government's
interests in regulating a specific industry are very strong, a warrantless administrative
search of the commercial establishment may be constitutionally permissible under the
fourth amendment. 2" Such searches will be valid, however, only for closely regulated
industries, and only if the search passes the newly articulated three-part test. 22°
The Court began its analysis of the reasonableness of the warrantless search by
ruling that the vehicle dismantling business was a closely regulated business in the state
of New York. 221
 In support of this ruling, the Court found that there were extensive
regulations covering this business. First, an operator must obtain a license, which means
that the operator must meet the registration requirements and pay a fee. 222 Second, the
operator must maintain a police book and record the purchase and sale of motor vehicles
and vehicle parts, and must make these documents and vehicles available to police officers
or Department of Motor Vehicle agents for inspection. 223 Third, the operator must
visibly display the registration number at the place of business, on business documen-
tation, and on all vehicles and parts that are part of the business inventory. 224
211
 Id. at 2646-47.
217 Id. at 2647-48.
218 Id. at 2648.
214
 Id. at 2639.
218 Id. at 2642.
216 m.
217 Id. at 2643.
218 Id.
219 Id.
228 Id. at 2643-44.
Ill Id. at 2644.
722 Id. at 2644-45.
228 Id. at 2645.
224 Id.
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The Burger Court reasoned that although it had previously emphasized the impor-
tance of the duration of a particular regulatory scheme in determining whether an
industry was closely regulated, duration was not dispositive. 225 The Court noted that the
automobile dismantling business had not been in existence very long and therefore did
not have a long history of government regulation. 226 The Court reasoned that this
absence of a long history of regulation was not determinative because the automobile
dismantling industry was merely a new branch of another industry that had been closely
regulated for years — the general junkyard and second-hand shop inclustry, 2" There-
fore, the Court concluded, the automobile dismantling industry qualified, by association,
as a closely regulated industry in which the operator had a reduced expectation of
privacy.225
Once the Court determined that the automobile dismantling industry was closely
regulated, the Court then examined the New York regulatory scheme to determine if it
satisfied the three-part test necessary to make warrantless administrative inspections
reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 229 First, the Court found that
the state had a substantial interest in regulating the vehicle dismantling and automobile
junkyard industry because of increased motor vehicle theft in New York and its link to
this industry. 23u Second, the Court found that the regulation of this industry furthered
the state's substantial interest in reducing automobile theft. 2" In reaching this determi-
nation, the Court found that requiring junkyard operators and vehicle dismantlers to
keep records inhibits the traffic in stolen vehicles. 232 Furthermore, the Court. reasoned,
as it had in Biswell, that warrantless, frequent and unannounced inspections were nec-
essary to enforce the regulatory scheme, 233
Finally, the Supreme Court found that the New York regulatory scheme satisfied
the third prong of the test by providing a constitutionally acceptable substitute for a
warrant."' The Court found the statute to he an adequate substitute for a warrant
because it informed the operator or owner of a vehicle dismantling business that regular
inspections would occur. 235 Therefore, the operator knew that the inspection was not a
discretionary act but was pu rsuant to a statute. 23 '' The Court_ reasoned that the time,
place, and scope of the inspection, under this statute, were limited, thereby placing
sufficient restraints on the discretion of the inspecting officers. 2"
223 Id.; see supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text.
"I Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2645.
227 Id. at 2646.
228 Id.
2" Id. at 2646-47. Automobile junkyards and vehicle dismantlers provide a major market for
stolen cars and car parts. Id, at 2647. Therefore, it is rational for a state to believe that it may be
able to reduce car theft by establishing regulations that require record-keeping and, thus, help
trace the origin and destination of vehicle parts. Id.
231 Id. at 2647.
232 1d. "It is well established that the theft problem can be addressed effectively by controlling
the receiver of, or Market in, stolen property." Id.
233 Id. at 2647-48.
23' Id. at 2648.
235 Id.
23(1 a
237 Id.
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The Burger Court rejected the New York Court of Appeals' holding that this statute
was unconstitutional because it had no real administrative purpose, but was instead
merely intended to provide police officers with a rapid method of enforcing criminal
penalties for possession of stolen property. 234 The Burger Court reasoned that a state
may address a major social problem, such as car theft, through both an administrative
scheme and the penal code. 232 The Court also stated that although the ultimate purpose
of the administrative scheme may be the same as the purpose of the penal laws (to
reduce automobile theft), its regulatory goals are narrower. 2" Whereas penal laws seek
to punish offenders, reasoned• the Court, the administrative scheme does not aim to
punish."' Instead, the administrative scheme seeks to ensure that vehicle dismantlers
are legitimate licensed business persons who have satisfied the record-keeping require-
ments, thus permitting the police to identify stolen vehicles and parts passing through
junkyards. 242 Therefore, the Burger Court concluded that an administrative scheme is
not rendered unconstitutional simply because its broad purpose parallels the purpose of
penal laws. 243
 Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that the administrative scheme was
not rendered unconstitutional merely because during the course of a valid administrative
inspection, a police office may discover evidence of crimes in addition to violations of
the administrative statute. 244 The Court here was simply reiterating the plain view doe-
. trine which sets forth that during a valid search, criminal or administrative, a police
officer may seize criminal evidence that is in plain view. 24 8
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion in Burger, argued that the Court had
rendered meaningless the general rule requiring warrants for administrative searches
of commercial property. 246 The implications of the Court's opinion, argued Justice Bren-
nan, if realized, would virtually end fourth amendment protections for owners of busi-
nesses in the realm of administrative searches. 242 Justice Brennan argued that the limited
exception to the warrant requirement for searches of closely regulated industries was
previously reserved for industries with a long history of close government regulation,
or industries that involved inherent and immediate danger to health or life. 248 Justice
Brennan contended that the Court's finding that vehicle dismantling was analogous to
the long regulated general junk and secondhand shop industry was insufficient to
establish Burger's vehicle dismantling business as being within a closely regulated in-
dustry. 2" Justice Brennan asserted that, although historical regulation is one factor in
deciding whether an industry is closely regulated, it is the pervasiveness and regularity
289
	 at 2649.
239 Id.
249 Id.
241 See id.
242 Id. at 2650.
243 See id. at 2649.
244 Id. at 2651.
243
 Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 (1989).
243 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined in his dissent
by Justice Marshall, and by Justice O'Connor in all but Part III. Id.
247 Id. at 2657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248 1d. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
249 Id. at 2652-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of the regulation that ultimately determines whether a warrant is necessary for a search
to be reasonable under the fourth amendment. 2"
Justice Brennan argued that neither the general junkyard industry nor the vehicle
dismantling industry were or ever had been pervasively regulated because the regulatory
requirements were minimal. 251 The only provisions that govern vehicle dismantling in
New York, the dissent noted, merely require an owner to register and pay a fee, to
display the registration visibly, to maintain a "police book," and to allow inspcctions. 262
Justice Brennan stated that the registration and record-keeping requirements could not
be characterized as pervasive regulation. 2" These requirements, he noted, are imposed
upon a vast number and variety of trades and businesses. 254 Justice Brennan stated,
moreover, that for vehicle dismantlers, in sharp contrast to the mine operators in Donovan
v. Dewey, no regulations governed the condition of the premises, the methods of oper-
ation, the business hours, or the equipment that was required to be used.2" The quantity
and specificity of the regulations governing mining, stated Justice Brennan, established
that industry as closely regulated. 25° The opposite is true for the vehicle dismantling
industry, argued Justice Brennan, where the regulations are too few and too general to
establish it as closely regulated. 257
Justice Brennan argued that if this minimal regulatory scheme qualified vehicle
dismantling as a closely regulated business, very few businesses could escape being
classified as closely regulated. 2" Therefore, Justice Brennan contended, the warrant
requirement was effectively becoming the exception instead of the rule.2" The general
rule had been that a warrant must be issued before a search is constitutionally valid. 2"
Justice Brennan then asserted that See, which established the warrant requirement for
administrative searches of commercial businesses, had been "constructively overruled"
by Burger. 261
Justice Brennan further argued that even if vehicle dismantling were a closely
regulated industry, the search in Burger violated the fourth arnendment. 262 Justice Bren-
nan asserted that the search violated the fourth amendment because the administrative
statute in question did not satisfy the third prong of the Court's three-part test which
requires a statute to provide an adequate substitute for a warrant. 2" To provide an
adequate substitute for a warrant, Justice Brennan noted, an administrative statute must
establish "a predictable and guided [governmental] presence." 2" Justice Brennan con-
tended that the statute did not establish the necessary certainty and regularity of in-
spections needed to provide a constitutionally acceptable substitute for a warrant because,
2" Id. at 2653 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 2653 n.4. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 2653 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2.."
2." ,
2" Id. at 2653 & n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra notes 177-194 and accompanying text.
256 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2653 & n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 2652,2653 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 2653 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 2653-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
261 Id. at 2653-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262 Id. at 2654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24S
	
id,
26.1
1028	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:1009
under the statute, a vehicle dismantler had no assurance that any inspections would ever
take place. 265 Moreover, stated Justice Brennan, "neither the statute, nor any regulations,
nor any regulatory body provide[d] limits or guidance on the selection of vehicle dis-
mantlers for inspection." 266 Justice Brennan argued that it was precisely this lack of
guidance concerning selection that caused the statutory scheme in Marshall to be declared
unconstitutional. 267
Once Burger had informed the police that he did not have an operating license or
a police book, as required by section 415-a5, Justice Brennan asserted that he had violated
every requirement of the administrative scheme. 2" 6 Justice Brennan argued that the
scope of the statute was exhausted once these administrative violations had been discov-
ered and that no subsequent search should have taken place. 269 Thus, because there was
no provision in the statute concerning possession of stolen vehicles, Justice Brennan
argued that the subsequent search conducted at Burger's vehicle dismantling business
could not possibly have uncovered any further violations of the statute.27° Therefore,
according to Justice Brennan, the police officers' subsequent search clearly was intended
solely to uncover evidence of criminal activity. 271 Because this search could not have
uncovered any administrative violations, Justice Brennan argued that it constituted a
warrantless search for criminal activity in violation of the fourth amendment. 272 He
argued that if the fourth amendment is to have any meaning in the realm of commercial
businesses, it must prohibit searches for evidence of criminal acts even if those searches
would also serve an administrative purpose, unless the searches are intended to uncover
an administrative violation.275
III. ANALYSIS OF THE WIDENING EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT IN THE
AREA OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
In New York v. Burger, the Supreme Court extended the previously narrow closely
regulated business exception to the warrant requirement to encompass the automobile
dismantling industry. 274 The Burger Court held that a warrantless administrative search
of a vehicle dismantling business, conducted pursuant to section 415-a5 of the New York
vehicle and traffic laws, was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 275
First, the Burger Court ruled that the vehicle dismantling industry was a closely regulated
industry in New York. 276 Second, the Court analyzed the regulatory scheme that per-
mitted the warrantless search, section 415-a5, and determined that it satisfied the three-
part test necessary to render the warrantless search reasonable under the fourth amend-
ment. 277
265
266
267 Id.; see supra notes 153-176 and accompanying text.
268 Id. at 2656 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
26° See Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2656 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27° Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 2655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
271 1d. at 2657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 2646.
275 1d.
276 Id.
277 Id.
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The first prong of the Court's three-part test requires the state to have a substantial
interest in regulating the industry. 2" The second prong sets forth that the warrantless
inspection must be necessary to Further the regulatory scheme. 279 The third prong
establishes that the statutory inspection program, in terms of certainty and regularity of
its application, must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.m To
be a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, the regulatory statute must
perform the two Functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner of' the commercial
premises that the search is made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope,
and it must litnit the discretion of the inspecting officers. 28 '
In his dissent, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority on three issues. First,
Justice Brennan argued that the vehicle dismantling industry was not a closely regulated
industry in New York. 282 Second, Justice Brennan asserted that even if vehicle disman-
tling were a closely regulated industry, the search violated the fourth amendment because
the administrative statute that allowed the search was not an adequate substitute for a
warrant and thus failed to satisfy the third prong of the Court's reasonableness test. 283
Third, Justice Brennan argued that the fundamental defect of the statute permitting
the warrantless administrative search was that it authorized searches intended solely to
uncover evidence of criminal acts. 284
Justice Brennan correctly observed that the Supreme Court in New York v. Burger
made a significant move away from the traditional constitutional requirement that a
warrant is required to conduct an administrative search of a commercial business. 2" The•
reasons upon which the Supreme Court based its determination that vehicle dismantling
qualifies as a closely regulated industry would classify most businesses as closely regulated.
Moreover, the relative ease with which the questionable statutory scheme passed the
Court's three-part reasonableness test leaves little doubt that warrantless administrative
searches conducted pursuant to statutory authority will receive minimal scrutiny by the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision that the search was consti-
tutional notwithstanding numerous indications that it was conducted solely to uncover
evidence of criminal activity sets a dangerous precedent in the area of' administrative
searches. The Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Burger signals the end of mean-
ingful fourth amendment protections for owners and operators of commercial busi-
nesses. 286
The first step toward determining that a warrantless administrative search is rea-
sonable within the fourth amendment is a finding that the business subject to the search
is part of a closely regulated industry."' The rationale underlying the closely regulated
business exception to the warrant requirement is based on a theory of privacy expecta-
tions. 2" The theory is that a person who chooses to engage in a heavily regulated industry
218 Id. at 2644.
x'9
28° Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228 See id. at 2654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2,4 /d, at 2655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
282 1d. at 2657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
287 See id. at 2646.
288 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313.
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has, in effect, consented to governmental regulations. 259
 The converse, however, is also
true. If a person does not work in a closely regulated industry, his or her expectations
of privacy are high and a warrantless administrative search of his or her business would
violate the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches. Therefore,
the definition of "closely regulated" is crucial because a ruling that a business is in a
closely regulated industry is the first step toward determining that a warrantless admin-
istrative search of that business is constitutionally permissible. 29°
The Supreme Court made two dubious arguments supporting its conclusion that
the automobile dismantling industry was a closely regulated industry. First, the Supreme
Court asserted that such regulatory requirements as record-keeping and licensing estab-
lished the vehicle dismantling industry as closely regulated. 29 ' Second, the Court stated
that the vehicle dismantling industry was closely regulated by virtue of its close association
to a similar industry that has long been subject to close regulation — the general junkyard
industry.292
The Supreme Court's holding that the bare administrative scheme in Burger qualified
the vehicle dismantling industry as closely regulated was inconsistent with its earlier
decisions. Previously, the Court granted an exception to the warrant requirement for
administrative searches only when the industry to be searched either had a long tradition
of being subject to close government regulation, or involved an inherent or immediate
danger to health or life. 295 Furthermore, the Dewey Court explained that although his-
torical supervision may help establish that close regulation of an industry exists, it is the
pervasiveness and regularity of regulation that ultimately determines whether a warrant
is necessary to render an administrative inspection scheme constitutionally permissible. 294
Justice Brennan compared the regulations in Dewey to those in Burger and correctly
noted that, in stark contrast to the close regulation of milling in Dewey, no regulations
governed the condition of work, the hours of work, the equipment to be used, or the
methods of operation in the vehicle dismantling industry. 295
Justice Brennan repeatedly emphasized that the vehicle dismantling industry was
not pervasively regulated in New York.29 6 Nonetheless, the Burger Court concluded that
the automobile dismantling industry was a closely regulated industry because an operator
must obtain a license, pay a fee, and maintain a police book. 297
 Justice Brennan appro-
priately pointed out in his dissent, however, that if the mere requirement of a filing fee
and a license were sufficient to place a business into the closely regulated business
category, few businesses could escape this classification. 295
 Justice Brennan explained
2 '9 Id,
299 See Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2646.
"I Id. at 2644-45.
292 Id. at 2646.
"'Id. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (allowed warrantless
inspection of mining organization because the mining industry is one of the most dangerous
industries in the United States); Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (permitted warrantless search of gun
dealer's business because government regulation of the firearm industry is of central importance
in preventing violent crimes); Colonnade, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (permitted warrantless search of a
liquor establishment because this industry has been closely regulated since 1692).
294 Dewey, 452 U.S. at 606.
292 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2653 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
297 Id. at 2644-45.
299
 Id. at 2653 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See the licensing and regulatory requirements described
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that New York, like many states and municipalities, imposed very similar and often more
comprehensive requirements on countless trades and businesses. 2" Therefore, the reg-
istration and record-keeping requirements can not justify characterizing an industry as
closely regulated unless almost all industries are to be characterized as such."° Accord-
ingly, Justice Brennan correctly argued that the vehicle dismantling industry in New
York should not be characterized as closely regulated.
The Supreme Court's second argument supporting its determination that vehicle
dismantling is a closely regulated industry was based on its decision to link two separate
industries together."' Unlike the liquor industry in Colonnade, vehicle dismantling does
not have a long history of close governmental regulation."2 This is the traditional
requirement to qualify an industry as closely regulated." 3 The Court, however, linked
the automobile dismantling industry to the general junkyard industry and, thereby,
carried over to the dismantling industry the general junkyard's long history of govern-
mental regulation."'
This classification by association, which was central to the Supreme Court's deter-
mination that the vehicle dismantling industry was closely regulated, is tenuous. If one
accepts the Court's reasoning, then any industry that is arguably related to a closely
regulated industry itself becomes classifiable as a closely regulated industry. Moreover,
because so many industries are by necessity interdependent, this reasoning, if carried to
its logical end, would establish most industries as closely regulated either because of their
own regulation or because of some association to a closely regulated industry. Therefore,
because of this fertile ground for confusion, the Court should clarify what standards it
will use to determine when an industry will be deemed closely regulated merely due to
its interdependence with other industries that are considered closely regulated.
Following the Supreme Court's determination that vehicle dismantling was a closely
regulated industry, it held that the statute satisfied the Court's three-part test, thereby
making the warrantless search reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. 305 The first prong of the test, requiring the state to have a substantial government
interest in regulating the industry, was clearly satisfied. Automobile dismantlers provide
a major market for stolen vehicles and, therefore, a state may rationally believe that
regulations involving record-keeping and licensing may help reduce car theft. 306 Justice
in NEW YORK CiTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § B32-1.0 (1977 and Supp.1985) (exhibitors of public
amusement or sport); § B32-22.0 (motion picture exhibitions); § 1332-45.0 (billiard and pocket
billiard tables); § 1332-46.0 (bowling alleys); § 1332-54.0 (sidewalk -cafes); § /132-58.0 (sidewalk
stands); § 1332-76.0 (sight-seeing guides); § B32-93.0 (public carts and cartmen); § B32-98.0 (debt
collection agencies); § B32-135.0 (pawnbrokers); § B32-138 (auctioneers); § 1332-167.0 (laundries);
§ 1332-183.0 (locksmiths and keymakers); § B32-206.0 (sales); § 1132-251.0 (garages and parking
lots); § B32-267.0 (commercial refuse removal); § B32-297.0 (public dance halls, cabarets, and
catering establishments); § B32-31 1.0 (coffeehouses); § 1332-324.0 (sight-seeing buses and drivers);
§ 1332-352.0 (home improvement business); § B32-467.0 (television, radio, and audio equipment,
phonograph service, and repairs); § B32-491.0 (general vendors); § 1332-532.0 (storage warehouses),
riled in Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2653 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
299
	 107 S. Ct. at 2653 (Brennan,I, dissenting).
300
32 ' Id, at 2646.
302 Id. at 2645. See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of Colonnade.
"3 Burger, 107 S. Gt. at 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
904 Id. at 2646.
"3 Id.
306 Id. at 2647.
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Brennan pointed out, however, that the majority has weakened the limitations on the
closely regulated industries category by permitting officers to proceed without a warrant
merely upon a showing of "substantial" state interest, instead of a showing of "urgent"
state interest.'0 In &swell, the Supreme Court stated that a warrantless administrative
inspection may proceed where the regulatory inspection furthers an "urgent" govern-
ment interest."8 Therefore, although the state clearly has a substantial interest in reg-
ulating the vehicle dismantling industry, the Court's decision to lower the standard from
"urgent state interest" to a "substantial state interest" may very well have the effect of
increasing the number of businesses that will be subject to warrantless administrative
searches.
The second prong of the Court's three-part test, requiring the warrantless inspection
to be necessary to further the regulatory scheme, was less clearly satisfied. The Court
stated that the situation in Burger was similar to the situation in Dewey and Biswell."9
 The
Burger. Court, using the same language as it had in Boswell, stated that frequent and
unannounced inspections were essential and that the prerequisite of a warrant would
frustrate inspections.") The Burger Court stated that because stolen cars pass quickly
through automobile junkyards, frequent and unannounced inspections were necessary,
and the surprise element was crucial, if the regulatory scheme were to function effec-
tively." Although the Camara Court stated that "warrants should normally be sought
only after entry is refused," the Court in its companion case, See, implied that this
procedure is not always necessary. 92 In See, the Court indicated that this rule does not
necessarily apply in the area of business inspections "since surprise may often be a crucial
aspect of routine inspections of businesses."" In Marshall, the Court raised this issue
and intimated, in dicta, that inspectors could avoid losing the surprise element by simply
regularly obtaining an administrative warrant prior to arriving at a business to conduct
an inspection.94
 Because warrants may be issued ex parse and executed without delay
and without prior notice, the element of surprise may always be retained."5 In Marshall,
the argument against the warrant requirement consisted of a concern for the adminis-
trative strain on the inspection system and the strain on the courts." 6 The Marshall
Court, however, stated that it was unconvinced that requiring a warrant would impose
serious strains on the inspection system or the courts. 3" Therefore, although the Burger
Court adamantly stated that warrantless administrative inspections were essential in order
to ensure the surprise element necessary to further the regulatory scheme, its reasoning
was unconvincing due to the fact that nothing prevents officers from obtaining a warrant
prior to an inspection.318
 Moreover, even if an inspector were to proceed without a
warrant and were refused entry to conduct an inspection, the ex parse nature of the
"7 Id. at 2654 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3" Id.; see Boswell, 406 U.S. at 317.
"9 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2648.
710 Id.
'II Id.
313
 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539; See, 387 U.S. at 545 n.6.
See, 387 U.S. at 545 n.6.
314 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 316, 317 n.12.
mid. at 316.
114 Id.
313 ld.
31" Id.
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warrant application ensures that the inspector could retain the surprise element by
merely returning unannounced to conduct the inspection accompanied by a warrant." 9
The third prong of the Court's test, requiring that the statute authorizing the
warrantless inspection is a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, was not
satisfied in Burger. To be a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, the regu-
latory scheme must perform the two basic functions of a warrant. 52° First, it must advise
the business owner that the search is authorized by the law and that it has a properly
defined scope. 921 Second, it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers. 922 In
order to perform the first function, the statute authorizing the warrantless search must
be so comprehensive and defined that a business owner could not help but be aware
that his or her property would be inspected periodically for specific reasons. 423 In order
to perform the second function of a warrant, the regulatory statute must be "carefully
limited in time, place, and scope. "924
The New York statute permitting the warrantless administration search of auto-
mobile dismantling businesses, section 4 I 5-a5 of the New York vehicle and traffic laws,
performed neither of the two basic functions of a warrant. The statute did not put a
business owner on notice that his or her property will be subject to inspections. 325 As
Justice Brennan noted, a business owner has no assurance that any inspections will ever
occur."" Section 415-a5 differs significantly in this respect from the statute in Dewey
which specifically defined the frequency of inspections. 327 The statute in Dewey required
that all surface mines be inspected at least twice a year, and all underground mines be
inspected at least four times a year. 529 As the Supreme Court stated in Dewey, inspections
may not be so "random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner, for all practical
purposes, has no real expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected
by government officials." 329 Therefore, the statute in Burger failed to perform the first
basic function of a warrant, which is to place a business owner on notice." 9 Accordingly,
the statute failed to provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."'
Moreover, section 415-a5 (lid not sufficiently limit the discretion of the inspecting
officers, and thereby failed to satisfy the second element necessary to establish it as a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. 92 The Burger Court stated that to
limit the discretion of the inspecting offiCers, the statute must carefully limit the time,
place, and scope of a searches" The Supreme Court in Burger held that the statute
sufficiently limited the time of permissible searches because officers could only conduct
519 See id, at 319-20.
320 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2644.
551 Id.
"2 Id.
523 Id,
924 Id.
525 Id. at 2654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
920
"7 Dewey, 452 U.S. at 596.
75, Id,
Id, at 599.
5" See Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"I Id.
"2 Id. at 2654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
355 Id, at 2644.
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inspections during regular business hours." The Court held that the statute sufficiently
limited the place because inspections could only be made at vehicle dismantling businesses
and related industries.'" Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the permissible scope was
sufficiently narrow because the inspectors were permitted to examine only the records
and the vehicles and parts that were subject to the record-keeping requirements of the
statute.'"
The New York statutory scheme, however, provided neither limits nor guidance
concerning the selection of vehicle dismantlers for inspection."s 7 This lack of guidance,
argued Justice Brennan, was precisely why the Court declared the statutory scheme in
Maishall unconstitutional.'" As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the statute's
only limitation was that the inspections must be conducted during business hours."9 The
statute's scope included all vehicles and parts subject to the record-keeping requirement
which the statute defined as all vehicles that were purchased for later sale, i.e., every
vehicle or part in the junkyard."6 Therefore, this statutory scheme provided unguided
discretion to police officers and thereby it is precluded from being an acceptable substi-
tute for a warrant."'
In contrast to this statute, a warrant would provide a vehicle dismantler with the
assurance that a neutral and detached.judicial officer has found that the inspection is
reasonable under the Constitution, that it is authorized by statute, and that it is conducted
pursuant to a regulatory scheme containing neutral and specific criteria."' Moreover, a
warrant would advise the owner, prior to inspection, of the scope and objects of the
search, beyond which the inspector may not proceed."49 Denying these important func-
tions of a warrant in favor of granting officers unbridled discretion in conducting
warrantless searches undermines the integrity of the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court in Burger stated that the administrative scheme set forth in
section 415-a5 was not unconstitutional merely because it had the same ultimate purpose
as certain penal laws, which was to reduce car theft."' The Court emphasized that a
state may address a major social problem such as car theft both by way of an adminis-
trative scheme and through a penal sanction.345 Justice Brennan, however, correctly
noted the increasing overlap of administrative and criminal violations and argued that
section 415-a5 was unconstitutional because it authorized searches intended solely to
uncover evidence of criminal acts."46 It is well established that a state may not use an
administrative inspection scheme as a pretext to search for criminal violations.'" In
"4 Id. at 2648.
335 Id.
", Id.
5" See id. at 2654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
333 Id. See supra notes 153-176 and accompanying text for a discussion of Marshall.
352 Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
340 See id. at 2648.
341 Id. at 2655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
342 See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 323.
34' Id.
344 See Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2649.
145
346 See id. at 2655, 2657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
347 Id. at 2655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Camara, the Court stated that public interest would not justify a sweeping search of a
city in hope of uncovering stolen goods."$ A search for stolen goods, the Camara Court
stated, is reasonable only when supported by probable cause that the stolen items will
be found in a particular dwelling."9
Justice Brennan argued that the state used the administrative scheme as a pretext
to search, without probable cause, for evidence of criminal violations.'" Justice Brennan
correctly noted that when Mr. Burger told the police that he was not registered to
dismantle vehicles as required by section 415-a 1 , and that he did not have a police book
as required by section 415-a5(a), he had violated every requirement of the administrative
scheme."' Therefore, because there is no administrative provision forbidding possession
of stolen vehicles, the search became one solely for evidence of criminal acts because all
the administrative violations had already been uncovered." 2
By failing to comply with the administrative requirements, a vehicle dismantler has
already violated every element of the regulatory scheme and thus no further adminis-
trative search can be conducted." Justice Brennan explained, however, that a vehicle
dismantler can not circumvent the administrative scheme and escape inspection by simply
failing to register or to keep records." 34 Rather, if the state chooses to conduct a search
for evidence of criminal violations, the police need only obtain a criminal search warrant
and then conduct a search.'" If failure to register and to keep required records are
sufficient to amount to probable cause, the officers will be able to obtain a criminal
search warrant.'" An officer, Justice Brennan asserted, could choose to remain on the
premises to ensure that the vehicle dismantler does not conduct any further business
while the other officers leave to go obtain a warrant.'" For these reasons, Justice Brennan
argued, a vehicle dismantler would not be able to thwart enforcement efforts by merely
failing to comply with the statute.'"
Therefore, because the administrative search in Burger could not have uncovered
any further administrative violations, it was a search for evidence of criminal activity
and this requires a warrant based upon probable cause.'" Although the Supreme Court
in Burger properly reasoned that a state may address a major problem both by way of
an administrative scheme and a penal sangtion, the state may not be permitted to
circumvent the requirements of the fourth amendment.'" The requirements of the
fourth amendment are violated when a state is allowed to use an administrative scheme
as a pretext to search without probable cause for evidence of criminal violations."'
3" Camara, 387 U.S. at 535; see also Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2655 & n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
549 Camara, 387 U.S. at 535; see also Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2655 & n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2656 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151 Id.
559 Id.
555 Id.
354 See id.
555 Id.
"(' Id. at 2656-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
557 Id. at 2657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"9 See id. at 2656 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"9 See id,
599 See id. at 2657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56L See id. at 2656 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1036	 BOSTON COI LEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:1009
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in New York v. Burger significantly reduces fourth
amendment protections for owners of commercial enterprises by rendering virtually
meaningless the general rule that a warrant is required for an administrative search of
a commercial business. Because the Supreme Court found pervasive regulation where
there was almost no regulation at all, and careful guidance where the police had almost
complete unchecked discretion, the result and likely impact of this case will be that the
warrant requirement will become the clear exception to the rule in the realm of admin-
istrative searches of commercial businesses.
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